Introduction
North Korea is one of the most heavily-sanctioned states in the world. Indeed, since the breakdown of negotiations after the Leap Day Agreement in 2012, sanctions have become the primary means whereby the United States, its allies and the broader international community via the United Nations Security Council have sought to exert pressure on the North Korean regime. Increasingly stringent sanctions have, however, failed to dissuade Pyongyang from developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or from engaging in illicit activities designed to support their development. As the broader literature on international sanctions suggests, this failure should not be surprising. Sanctions analysts have long argued that target states find it relatively easy to circumvent sanctions, and that sanctions can actually serve to strengthen rather than undermine the domestic political authority of the target state.
More recently, however, a more optimistic body of literature has emerged that has enthusiastically celebrated financial sanctions as an effective means of imposing broad economic costs on targeted states (Zarate 2013; Arnold 2016; Torbat 2005; Loeffler 2009 ). 1 The authors would like to express their gratitude to three anonymous reviewers as well as the participants in a panel at the Joint East Asian Studies Conference at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, September 2016, for valuable and constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this article. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2016S1A5A8020098).
Such measures work by explicitly proscribing third party banks from engaging in financial dealings with target state entities, and more broadly, by enforcing global norms and standards on international banks regardless of their geographical location. Banks that fail to adhere to these standards face the possibility of being shut out of the dollar-based international financial system. As such, the potential profits to be made through sanctions evasion are outweighed by the costs of being labelled a "money-laundering concern." Here, the case of North Korea has frequently been cited as a successful instance of this approach.
The US Treasury's action against Macao's Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in 2005 ostensibly demonstrated the extent to which it was possible to exert pressure on a third-party private financial entity to cut its ties with so-called "rogue regimes." As Juan Zarate notes, as a result of the actions against BDA, "... North Korea found its bank accounts and illicit financial activity in jeopardy. A North Korean deputy negotiator at the time quietly admitted to a senior White House official, 'You finally found a way to hurt us'" (Zarate 2013) .
In this article, we challenge this optimistic assessment of financial sanctions through a reexamination of the North Korean case. On the one hand, the case for North Korea as testament to the efficacy of financial sanctions is undermined by the straightforward fact that the strengthening of those sanctions and the isolation of the country from the international financial system has not led to any significant macroeconomic impact on the North Korean economy. Conversely, the strengthening of financial sanctions has coincided with an increase in North Korea's external trade and gradual improvement in several industrial sectors. This challenges the case for financial sanctions since although such measures are in the first instance aimed at targeting illicit financial dealings, their effectiveness is also deemed to be related to the fact that they are able to isolate the target state completely from the international financial system and, by doing so, exert considerable economic pressure on the target state.
This argument is made through an analysis of the relationship between financial sanctions and the Sino-North Korean border economy. The reasons for this focus are twofold. First, it is no exaggeration to say that the Sino-North Korean border economy has become central to North Korea's economic survival. As our analysis suggests, however, financial sanctions are, as with more traditional and smart sanctions, susceptible to evasive strategies. Our focus on the Sino-North Korean border economy is also advantageous in methodological terms. In contrast to more overtly illicit activities aimed at supporting Pyongyang's WMD programme, it is considerably easier to conduct a reliable analysis of North Korea's external economic relations through examining Chinese customs statistics and conducting field research in the Chinese border regions.
2 Indeed, the fact that Sino-North Korean trade now accounts for the vast majority of North Korea's total external trade means that the impact of financial sanctions on the country can be more accurately examined. Specifically, we ask
the question of what impact financial sanctions have had on methods of trade settlement and transactions within the border economy. As we argue, the failure of financial sanctions to exert any discernible macroeconomic pressure on the North Korea economy is largely a result of the manner in which they have encouraged the use of cash and barter in trade settlement as well as the persistence of certain forms of smuggling. Moreover, the tightening of financial sanctions has also meant that North Korean financial institutions have themselves increasingly utilised informal cross-border networks. The case study of the Sino-North Korean border economy thus challenges the optimism of the financial sanctions literature and calls for greater consideration of how actors are able to deploy strategies of evasion.
Before we proceed, it is necessary to briefly discuss issues relating to the generalisability of the case study. On the one hand, the failure of financial sanctions to have any marked impact on North Korean elites' might not come as a surprise to the majority of sanctions analysts. The authoritarian nature of the regime, the apparent elite unity over the pursuit of 
From Trade to Financial Sanctions
The mainstream sanctions debate has produced a sizable literature focusing on the question of whether sanctions are effective tools of statecraft or not. "Effectiveness" here is understood to denote the extent to which sanctions are capable of altering the behaviour of the target state, or more ambitiously, of facilitating regime change within the target state (Hufbauer et al. 1990; Pape 1997; Elliott 1998 and found that sanctions were at least partially successful in just 34 per cent of all the cases.
As such, they concluded that sanctions are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals aimed at compelling a target country to take actions it resists, though they noted that the success rate varied in accordance with the type of policy or governmental change sought (Hufbauer et al. 1990, pp.92-93 properly be regarded as "successes" (Pape 1997, p.93 ).
There are many reasons for the low efficacy of trade-based sanctions. These include, for example, the relative ease with which target states are able to evade sanctions. In Galtung's study of Rhodesia in the 1960s, the latter's extensive land borders and opportunities for smuggling played a key role in undermining the impact of multilateral sanctions (Galtung 1967, p.398 flower because it is difficult to trace the origin and destination of traded goods" (Hufbauer et al. 1990, p.106) . Such evasion strategies may also have more deleterious outcomes. In the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, for example, trade-based sanctions contributed to the criminalisation of the state, economy, and civil society of both the targeted country and its immediate neighbours, thereby fostering a symbiosis between political leaders, organised crime, and transnational smuggling networks (Andreas 2005) .
Comprehensive trade sanctions have also been criticised due to their excessive human costs, as demonstrated in Iraq during the 1990s (Halliday 1999) . Indeed, the fact that it was military action that ultimately toppled Saddam Hussein only served to increase the general pessimism towards trade sanctions as a tool of foreign policy.
The poor record of trade sanctions at achieving their stated objectives as well as their significant secondary effects led in the 1990s to a shift in emphasis towards so-called "smart sanctions" that include measures such as travel bans and asset freezes that are directed more towards key individuals in the target regime leadership (Cortright & Lopez 2002) . Smart sanctions have, however, similarly come under increasing critical scrutiny in recent years. This is in part a result of the questionable theoretical assumptions that underpin them. As Lee Jones has argued, comprehensive trade sanctions were founded on the liberal understanding of human subjects as rational utility maximisers and the related assumption that if sanctions produced enough suffering within the target society, popular discontent would force the ruling elite to change their policies. Smart sanctions, on the other hand, reverse that assumption in viewing human subjects as incapable of exerting pressure on their governments and as vulnerable victims of the regime (L. Jones 2015, p.19) . However, it has been argued that the very fact that smart sanctions do not aim to impose significant costs on the target economy means that they have been even less successful in generating policy concessions than comprehensive embargoes (Drezner 2015) .
As such, the fact that smart sanctions have not proved demonstrably more effective than traditional sanctions (Elliott 2002 ) has contributed to increased pessimism towards such
measures.
An exception to this pessimistic view of sanctions efficacy has been the increased popularity of financial sanctions in the post-9/11 era, which are deemed capable of inflicting considerable costs on the economies of target states (Torbat 2005) . Financial sanctions work by pressuring banks rather than governments to act as agents of international isolation. Typically, the US Treasury issues watch lists and banks are then expected to block suspected assets and transactions, thereby cutting individuals and organisations off from the global financial system. Reputational concerns regarding the danger of being labelled a "money laundering concern" mean that even non-US banks have strong motivations to adhere to Treasury watch lists even when they are not required to do so by domestic or international law (Loeffler 2009 ).
As such, the efficacy of financial sanctions is understood to stem from the hegemonic position that the US occupies in global finance. As Drezner notes, international actors need access to US capital markets and particularly to US dollars in order to conduct cross-border transactions. This access matters more to banks and non-bank financial actors than any potential profit that may come from violating Treasury warnings. This means that whereas market forces tend to weaken trade-based sanctions, they serve to strengthen financial sanctions (Drezner 2015 Europe subsequently began to close down or limit their North Korean bank accounts (Wertz 2013, pp.73-74) .
Framed as aimed at "safeguarding the international financial system," these measures had a devastating impact on North Korea's ability to engage with the global financial system. Due to the resulting pressure on North Korea, it has been claimed that the BDA designation was successful in bringing the country back to negotiations over Pyongyang's WMD programme (Eckert 2008 and the use of cash for trade settlement and investment. These informal strategies serve both as a means of evading sanctions as well as avoiding customs duties and cumbersome procedures. They also reflect the fact that financial sanctions have undermined attempts by the Chinese government to establish a more robust cross-border financial system. As such, we argue for more nuanced analysis of how financial sanctions are contingent upon geoeconomic specificities and are, as with other forms of sanctions, susceptible to evasive practices. We proceed by examining how financial sanctions have been situated within a broader array US, Japanese, South Korean, and multilateral UNSC sanctions.
Bilateral and Multilateral Sanctions Against North Korea
Sanctions applied to North Korea include a range of bilateral and multilateral measures.
The US, for example, has for nearly seven decades applied stringent bilateral trade sanctions against North Korea on a number of pretexts including North Korea's activities related to the proliferation of WMD, regional provocations, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, undemocratic governance, and illicit activities such as money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods and currency, and bulk cash smuggling (Rennack 2011, p The sanctions included mandatory inspections of cargo shipments entering and leaving North Korea, the prohibition of sales of all conventional weapons to the country including small arms, a ban on North Korean exports of coal, iron ore, gold, and other mineral products, and a ban on sales of jet fuel to the country. However, potential buyers are only obligated to turn back shipments of minerals when there are grounds to believe that the proceeds would benefit North Korea's military, raising questions regarding the levels of proof required. Furthermore, the sanctions do not affect trade being conducted for "livelihood and humanitarian purposes," leaving a great deal of discretion to countries such as China as to how far to enforce the ban on North Korean mineral exports (Babson 2016 Korea's fourth nuclear test in January 2016, the South Korean authorities closed down the KIC, leading to an almost complete halt in inter-Korean economic exchange.
As can be seen, North Korea has been subject to a stringent set of bilateral and multilateral sanctions. As Pyongyang's fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016 suggests, these sanctions have failed to achieve their explicit objective of inhibiting the country's nuclear ambitions.
Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest that they have had elicited any significant macroeconomic shock to the North Korean economy (Noland 2009 ). Indeed, the severe external shocks experienced by North Korea in recent years have resulted mainly from the end of the country's favourable trading relationships with the Soviet Union and China in the early 1990s rather than through decades-long international sanctions. Nonetheless, the stringent Japanese and South Korean sanctions combined with the more targeted UNSC sanctions alongside China's lax enforcement of the latter have led to a re-orientation of North Korea's external economic relations towards China (Haggard & Noland 2013 ). As will be discussed below, this shift has facilitated the increasing importance of the SinoNorth Korean border economy and, as a consequence, the prominence of informal trade practices within North Korea's external economic relations more broadly. In the following section, we provide an overview of the scope of this emerging border economy and the key actors involved, before going on to discuss the specific impact of financial sanctions.
The Rise of the Sino-North Korean Border Economy
The helps Chinese traders negotiate the risk of arbitrary changes in rules and practices as well as the lack of a reliable mechanism of dispute resolution (Haggard et al. 2012, p.132) . A further reason why official bank transfers are not used is that China's foreign exchange rules do not allow individuals to transfer more than US$ 50,000 per year overseas without permission from the relevant financial authorities. In addition, foreign exchange regulations stipulate that when a private enterprise opens a bank account for the purposes of conducting foreign trade, the financial institution is required to evaluate the enterprise's financial accounts and examine supporting trade documents before allowing the transfer of money out of the country.
That this poor regulatory environment has encouraged informal methods of trade settlement is not surprising. It is important to note, however, that financial sanctions have further encouraged the use of informal methods of trade settlement as an evasive strategy. The predominance of the US in the global financial system amidst the growing "weaponisation of finance" has meant even before the US Treasury took overt actions against financial institutions dealing with North Korea, the Pyongyang authorities adopted defensive measures that created strong disincentives for traders to use the official banking system. In an attempt to reduce its dependence on US dollar-based international payment system, North Korea has since 2002 adopted the Euro as its official trading currency. A consequence of this is that when a North Korean firm requests a Korean bank to make a money transfer to a Chinese partner, the Pyongyang office of that bank first has to make a conversion into Euros before contacting its branches in China. The Chinese branch then duplicates the process by converting Euros into Dollars or Renminbi before making the payment to the Chinese enterprise. Unsurprisingly, this results in excessive bank fees being charged. One Chinese merchant cited an example of fees amounting to US$ 500 being charged on a remittance of US$ 6,000 from North Korea. Traders also complain about the slowness of the official banking transfer system. It typically takes a minimum of three to seven working days and, in some cases, more than fifteen days for Chinese enterprises to receive payments from North Korea into their local bank accounts in China. 12 These high fees and the complicated system of bank transfers of foreign exchange between the two countries thus further encourages the reliance on cash for trade settlements instead.
Even when the official banking system is used, the growing use of financial sanctions has meant that bank transactions do not necessarily take place separately from the informal Furthermore, Kim and Jung's (Kim & Jung 2015) enforcement of them has meant there have been increased opportunities for traders on both sides of the border to engage in informal evasive practices. The growing prevalence of financial sanctions has led to the failure of the cross-border banking system to develop in line with the expansion of cross-border trade and investment. As we argue in the next section, while the growing informal cross-border economy has been of increasing concern to the Chinese authorities, attempts to encourage traders' use of the official banking system has increasingly come into conflict with Beijing's concerns regarding the explicit targeting by the US Treasury of banks doing business with North Korea.
Financial Sanctions and Regulation of the Cross-Border Economy
Given that informal trade and investment practices tend to impede the monitoring of flows and statistical reporting and facilitates smuggling and tax evasion (Reilly 2014, p.929 At the very least, however, we argue that the North Korean case suggests that the newfound optimism towards the use of financial sanctions needs to be re-examined. 
